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"The capitalist threatis that the system is unstable, liable to breakdown. That's one threat. And second,
the system is very powerful. It's extremely successful. And due to its success it penetrates into areas of
life-of society where it doesn't really belong" (PBS 1998). 1

Iri France the·Juppe government reduced social benefits to cut down the publicsector deficit by over one-third to fulfill the Maastricht treaty's criteria; Nevertheless, the
French government policies led to a series of strikes that had a tremendous impact on the
French economy. A couple of years later, the Asian crisis in September of 1997 hit the
South-East Asian countries one by one, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and
Indonesia all experiencing currency tumbles and stockmarket crashes. In South Korea,
the political inertia before the run-up elections created panic among the investors and the
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living standards of the average citizen were threatened (Economist 1997a, 20; Economist
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1997b, 83). The reality of the economic meltdown left most of the South-East Asian
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countries in shock and at a loss in knowing how to deal with slower economic growth and
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necessary economic restructuring and its political consequences.
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The situation in South East Asia and in Europe provides some indications that
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governments need to be responsive to the demands of the population. One of the
problems with most of the Asian countries is that they have no elaborate programs to
provide unemployment benefits, while they face the possibility of almost zero economic
growth for the next three years.
One of the foremost governmental institutions, which seem to be threatened by
international capitalism, has been the welfare state. Gilpin (1987) claimed that the future
of the national welfare state is at stake in a non-welfare international system.
Nevertheless, the phenomena of civil unrest in various countries such as France, South
1

Interview of George Soros by Danny Schechter in PBS.

2

Korea, and Thailand (Indonesia had already experienced riots) were indicative that
welfare states are even more in need than ever. Rodrik (1997) argues that global
economy creates winners and losers, while the governments are caught in the middle
amidst the different social groups. Governments maintain social integration and protect
segments of the population from the effects of global economy by actually increasing the
levels of welfare spending. The neo-institutional arguments of public choice theory and
the compatibility literature on the welfare state support the Rodrik argument (North 1990,
. i

.,

North and Weingast 1989, Knight 1995, and Fitoussi 1996) .
The study of welfare states remains relevant and current even with the increasing
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scientific and journalistic interest at the phenomenon of globalization. The optimistic
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arguments on globalization support that globalization of economic transactions can
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improve the chances for economic development and growth. On the other hand,
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globalization can be a double-edged sword. As the recent public reactions to the World
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Trade Organization (WTO) meeting in Seattle and the meeting of the World Bank and the·
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International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Washington, D. C. (April 2000) revealed there is a
shattered consensus to the promise of globalization. The reactions are not deriving
anymore from political adversaries to a global free market system, but from popular
disdain and resistance (Borosage 1999). To understand the significance of the welfare
state within the context of increasing globalization, it is necessary to explore the raison

d'etre ofwelfarl;! programs and to identify the ways that welfare programs interact with
other critical political and economic variables su.ch as income inequality and political
stability.
In this study I argue that welfare transfers have been traditionally a mechanism

3

that governments apply to avoid incidents of political instability and reduce income
inequalities. Nevertheless, in the short-term governments may focus primarily on
political stability as their ultimate goal and they make choices that increase income
inequality. In the long-term, however, redistribution of resources and political consensus
that lead to long-term political stability can coexist as goals and associate with high levels
of welfare expenditures.2 This study discusses th~ two principal functions of welfare
programs, consensus-building and redistribution of resources, and it presents a theoretical
perspective on how governments define short term vs. long term policies in social

l
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spending. The cases of Malaysia and South Korea are examined to illustrate the presented
model.
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A basic assumption regarding governmental behavior that is embraced in this
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study is that governments h~ve as an ultimate goal to remain in power, hence most
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governments try to balance policies that maintain competitiveness and political stability.
Rodrik (1997) argues that the globalization process creates domestic winners and losers,
while the governments are caught in the middle amidst the different social groups.
Hence, depending on domestic dynamics, governments face a serious policy dilemma
regarding the effects of global economy on the local economies.
In most of the debates regarding the future of the welfare state, political issues are
often overlooked. The welfare state as an institutional framework was initially
estaqlished to build up consensus within the population by way of redistributing
resources. The central message that permeates this study is that welfare transfers cannot
be studied in political vacuum. Welfare transfers are only one of the many mechanisms

2

The levels of welfare transfers that they may seek depend on the choices that the societies make regarding
their goals of economic growth, political stability, and the distribution of resources within the societies.

4

that governments possess in redistributing resources. As long as governments use
welfare transfers, we need to explore their role in economic and political development.
This paper is divided in four sections. The first section concentrates on the
history of the welfare state. The second section looks at the process of political and
economic development. In the third section the focus turns to two cases that elaborate the
key points of the theoretical argument. The concluding section discusses the policy
implications and future extensions of this study.
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1. BUILDING POLITICAL CONSENSUS AND DISTRIBUTING
RESOURCES: THE POLITICAL GOALS OF THE WELFARE STATE

1

.!

A variety of elaborate government and non-profit organizations' programs. fall
under the category of welfare programs, since the term "welfare" is not restricted to the
programs sponsored by the state. In its narrowest definition, the phrase "welfare state"
denotes specific policies and services provided by the state. Usually, educational and
military expenditures, and public investments are excluded. 3 In a broader sense, "welfare
state" refers to either a specific type of polity, or a

form ofthe'state, or a certain type of

society (Pierson 1991, 7).
Most of the historians of the "welfare state" accredit imperial Germany as the
forerunner of modern welfare programs. In 1881 Bismarck instituted the basis of the first
social security legislation in an effort to shift the loyalties of the working class.
Bismarck's system was a "carrot and stick" policy, targeting the social democratic
movement, and it was planned to cope with prevailing social problems. The state had the
monopoly providing social insurance, which enhanced the paternalistic nature of the
3

Educational expenditures contribute more into equality of opportunity rather than to social security and
equality. For more information on this argument see Wilensky (1975). For the variety of welfare programs
a:nd the different types of welfare state, see Baldwin (1989), Kloosterman (1994), and Sainsbury (1991).

5

German state. The insurance reform was not an actual expansion of the state's functions
but a qualitative transformation (Ullman 1981, 134-135).4
The term "welfare state" was coined in Britain in 1941, while Great Britain alone
was standing against Germany. The predecessor of the British welfare state was
established in 1911 as the Liberal government's National Insurance Act, promoted by
experts such as William Beveridge and prepared by .Winston Churchill and Lloyd
George. This Act was targeting the "left out millions who were miserable" in the ·heyday ·
·_ 1
.· i
·.·,

of the British empire. In both cases of policy-making, British administrators replicated
the social policies established in imperial Germany (Flora and Heidenheimer 1981, 1819).5 The welfare state has been an integral component of the developmental process and
the solidification of the state within the developed countries in the late 19th, early 20th
century.
In this study I conceive welfare state as a societal structure. The terms welfare
programs, welfare transfers, and welfare state are all used in this study for variation
without any alteration to the conceptualization of welfare state. The state intervenes in the
distribution of economic and social resources to secure their equitable reallocation and
Last, but not least, seethe seminal work by Epsing-Andersen (1990).
For a different opinion regarding the beginning of the modern welfare state see Lindert (1994).
5
We can separate the welfar~ state's development into four major periods. From 1880 to 1914 most of the
developed countries, excluding Canada and the United States, introduced state-organized systems for
workers' insurance and compensation. The state assumed the responsibility of protecting the workers who
were incapable of earning a living due to sickness, age, or unemployment. In the years after the First
World War,from 1920 to 1940, the welfare state was consolidated and the foundations of the modern
welfare state were grounded. In Britain for the first time the government managed the negotiations between
the organized labor and the industrialists. Most of those developments in the welfare system occurred in
attempt by governments to mitigate intense social crises (Pierson 1991,106-107, 116).
The period after 1945 was the "Golden Age" of the welfare state. During this period, social expenditures as
a percentage of GNP increased geometrically. The initial reforms became comprehensive under the
principle of universal citizenship. There was a broad consensus in favor of an extended welfare state along
with economic growth. Following this path of sustained growth, the 'Golqen Age' lasted for thirty years.
In the mid-seventies, after almost a hundred years of continuous growth, the welfare state came under
scrutiny. The confidence of citizens in the capacity of mixed economic systems to provide economic
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guarantee a minimum level of income. Moreover, the welfare state provides social
cohesion, by reallocating resources. Hence, in this study the role of welfare state as both
distributive and integrating mechanism is explored.
The core of the western welfare state has been political and social security, and
equality. In the modem welfare state, social security has been associated with the
expansion of social rights and comprehensive social citizenship. Both elements of the
political system are associated with social inclusion and universal .in-scope policies. The
social welfare state distributes either direct funds or services in-kind to secure the
working class from contingencies, such as involuntary unemployment, sickness and
injuries, maternal leaves, and old age retirement. Despite the popular view that welfare
payments mainly assist the poor, these payments are only a small portion of the
government transfers. 6 Thus, in many cases the term "social security spending" is
preferred to "welfare state" to delineate the role of social security in maintaining a
minimum income level (Pampel and Williamson 1988, 16).7 We can distinguish three
primary goals of welfare programs: redistribution, efficiency,and social cohesion in the
society.
Redistribution targets the promotion of equality or social justice. Any time that
the issue of inequality is embraced, it is presumed that the state is going to intervene in
growth and social equity was eroded due to economic stagnation during the seventies and early eighties
(Pierson 1991, 125, 141).
6
John Mueller a senior economic advisor who was a Reagan Republican conservative recently was
engaged in a study on who are going to be the winners and losers under the privatization of Social Security
in the United States. To his surprise, applying simulation and forecasting models, the facts indicated that
no private institutional structure could efficiently provide the stability and security that state supported
social security does. The only segment of the population that will benefit from the privatization of social
security is single men, because they tend to have higher incomes and they live fewer years. Although many
debates focus on the two extremes, either very we;ilthy or very poor segments of the population, it is an
undeniable fact that the primary recipients of welfare transfers and social security are the middle class,
which after all bears a significant political weight (Mueller 2000).
7
On the conceptualization of welfare state see Flora and Heidenheimer (1981 ). For various policy
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the process ofredistributing resources. 8 Ironically, the quest for social security dates
back to the liberal arguments for individual freedom and limited action by the state. It is
only the state, however, that can provide social security ancl welfare programs. The state
is the only institutional mechanism in modern society that can provide a form of
collective intervention to the demands for entitlements. States have the authority and the
power to ensure that the redistribution is going to take place. 9 Hence, the impact of
globalization that threatens the political and economic autonomy of the states to make
policy choices.
The problems of the welfare expenditures arise from the supply-side (e.g. Who is
going to bear the costs? At what point these costs do more harm than good? Does the
welfare state offer the opportunity for moral hazard and free riding?).- What remains
critical, however, is that the welfare state must work based on a socially defined
conception of what amount of welfare is enough. Demarcation lines are built by social
consensus (Offe 1994, 87-90). The goal of efficiency becomes pertinent, because of
market imperfections (i.e. adverse selection, externalities), while social unity (building
applications of 'social citizenship', a concept initiated by Alfred Marshall in 1949, see Klausen (1995).
There are four possible domains of redistributive policies. First, the state either promotes greater equality
or establishes minimum standards to prevent segments of the population from falling below the socially
acceptable levels of living ( e.g., housing, health care, level of education). Second, another issue concerning
distributive policies is their range: universal or specific to particular segments of the population. Third,
sometimes the emphasis is on the means to achieve redistribution (providing services such as medical care
in school kids) and .on the impact of policies on specific variables delineating the citizens' well being ( e.g.,
health, food sufficiency). In the fourth domain, redistributive policies are divided between those that
emphasize access and equality of opportunity (e.g., education) and those that focus on the amount of
service that is on demand. The distinction between equal access and amount of a service can be
summarized as follows: the former is concerned that everybody starts from the same point, the latter aims
at everybody ending at the same point (Goodin and Le Gr-and 1987, 5-8).
9
There are concerns regarding the authority of the state to provide welfare programs. First of all, from a
critical point of view; the state distribution follows the predetermined distribution .ofresources. The right
critique to welfare state is that welfare programs create a condition of moral hazard, since they provide
incentives to people to get into undesirable behavior. On the other hand, the counter argument remains that
the state is the only institution that has the power to ensure that the system is not abused. Most of the
arguments that favor state interference are based on moral and ethical considerations. The most well known
argument is by John Rawls. Thus, the tradeoff is between the society's need to expand its production and
8

8

consensus) is one of the very initial objectives of the welfare state, through which the
welfare state becomes a contributing factor to social integration. This aspect of the
welfare state remains secondary in the literature, although it deserves further exploration
as a positive extemality of government intervention.
The next logical question that arises is whether the three goals (distribution,
consensus-building, efficiency) of the welfare state are complementary or contradictory
to each other. Although inefficiencies may arise from the price discrimination process
(redistribution includes different prices to different segments of the population and may
create disincentives), there is no substantive trade-off between redistribution and the
other goals of the welfare state. At face value, the majority of the literature agrees that
the role of government as a redistributive mechanism brings about inefficiencies- (Alesina
and Rodrik 1991, 1994). Thus, the role of welfare expenditures in alleviating market
·,

el

imperfections is contradictory.
The redistribution of resources and building political consensus can be compatible
or contradictory to each other, depending on the time span of government choices.
Equity and efficiency are compatible in the long-run, but this may not be the case in the
short run. The distinction between long and short-run is neither clear nor it is explored in
the literature. It is quite fundamental, however, to understand the functions of welfare
programs and their interaction with levels of political stability and income distribution.
For the purpose of this study I define short-term policies those that have an effect within
one year from the point of implementation (e.g., policies that may lead to the
manipulation of economic indicators before elections). Long-term policies are those that
have an effect within five to ten years after their implementation. These definitions are
the redistribution of the production goods in a socially appropriate way (Taylor..:Gooby 1994, 82-85).
9

quite arbitrary, however, they provide a time framework to comprehend the political
process involved in policy making on social issues.
Following the above-mentioned distinction between short-term and long-term
effects, we cart distinguish long-term and short-term functions of the welfare state.
Redistribution ofresources is the welfare programs' function on which most of the
economic and public choice literature is focusing. Empirical analysis and a simple
overview of the time series data on income distribution reveal it is one of the most
resilient socio-economic variables, unless the redistribution targets the initial levels of the
allocated resources (e.g., an extensive and progressive agricultural reform performed in
South Korea) {Deininger and Squire 1996). Altering the level of income inequality is
definitely a long-term goal, as it requires many years for changes in income inequality to
become apparent if at all. Hence, it becomes obvious that in the case of an immediate
political or economic crisis, altering the levels of income inequality is not going to be a
viable option for a government
whose rule is threatened. Inevitably, governments
'
.
perceive that an effective income distribution is a long-term shot compatible with longterm economic goals, whereas avoiding political disruptions a shorter-term political goal.
Nevertheless, welfare transfers can reduce political violence in the short-term,
while in the long-term by maintaining the level of income distribution at an acceptable
level the welfare state can enhance long-term institutional stability. The Bismarck laws
or the changes that occurred in Great Britain, in the period from 1914-1918 are examples
of welfare laws that were created with short-term effects in mind rather than long-term
ones. It is quite obvious that the conception of those laws was not targeting long-term
changes in the distribution of resources, rather the focus was on creating support for the

10
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political regime or to reduce political confrontation, hence building-consensus.
Thus, in the short-term, welfare programs are targeting political instability that
can be immediately threatening to the political system. In this case redistribution may
reduce the probability of regime change, but it will not necessarily reduce income
inequality. Governments may choose to attract groups that are essential for the survival,
thinking about their short-term interest of remaining in power.· Inequality may actually
increase among the various socio-economic.groups. In the short-term transfers and
welfare programs may become useful to the political survival of the government, but in
the long-run the redistribution may have a crowd-out effect on investment or lead to
increased taxation to support the desired programs. Hence, the short-term policy may
have adverse effects in the long-run as welfare programs become inhibitive of economic
growth. On the contrary, a welfare system becomes efficient if the short-term goals do
not undermine the longer goals of equity and political stability.
Long-term policies that focus on institutional political stability depend on the
consensus established between the government and the population (North and Weingast

1989, North 199or On the other hand; long-term income inequality can be erosive to the
stability of the political regime. Given the empirically supported argument that political
stability is a necessary condition for economic growth and development, long term
sustained economic development can be undermined by a severely unequal distribution
of income, which may contribute to political instability. 10
The coordination between short-term and long-term effects of welfare transfers
can be best seen in developed countries, where welfare programs have functioned as the

10

It is questionable whether income inequality is directly related to political instability. Income inequality
is the necessary rather than the sufficient condition that leads to political instability.
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foundation of a more egalitarian income distribution, harmonized with stable political
systems and higher levels of economic development. Do developing countries follow
similar patterns of welfare structures? The answer is that developing countries seem to
have qualitatively different paths of welfare state development, because of the different
impact that long-term inequality may have on political institutions. Nevertheless, I
assume that the fundamental reasoning behind the establishment of welfare transfers
remains the same, regardless of level of development. Governments want to maintain
political power. Thus, welfare transfers can be used to mitigate social grievances; The
case of Malaysia elaborates how a developing country used welfare transfers to reduce
long term income inequality among the three ethnic groups and to maintain regime
stability in the long run.
Malaysia applied welfare programs that improved income distribution in the longrun and through that assembled the population around the common goal of economic
development. Economic development was a process in which every group or segment of
the population could participate; hence the long-term support to the political system was
achieved. I I On the other hand, South Korea's welfare policies were more of short-term
time spans, targeting political consensus to maintain uninterrupted economic .
development. Hence, the two countries present opposing paths to economic development
and policy choices on the type of the welfare transfers and programs.
The following section discusses the existing theoretical debate on equity vs.
efficiency and presents the theoretical framework that explores the dynamics between

11

Endogenous theories of growth have indicated that investment has positive externalities on economic
development. For efficient investment to occur, however, a stable political system is required. By
enhancing political stability, welfare spending indirectly affects the level of economic growth. On the other
hand, it is unclear whether welfare transfers are actually enhancing income inequality or·suppress it
·

12

income inequality, political stability, and welfare transfers. A central point of discussion
is if governments are aiming at their short-term interest, then why do governments choose
in the first place long-term policies that reduce income inequality and enhance political
instability.

2. Welfare State: The Quest for Political Stability and Equity
South Korea and Malaysia may seem quite unlike cases for comparing the path of
welfare state development to build political consensus. As cases they exhibit several
commonalities and differences in critical variables that could explain the different
i

i
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i

political choices regarding the welfare programs. South Korea's welfare programs were

j

more influenced by short-term policy goals, while Malaysia's political choices were the

I1

outcome of long-term factors leading to an elaborate welfare state for developing

!
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countries' standards. To begin with both countries share a colonial past, although from

j

different imperial power. South Korea was under Japanese imperial rule. Malaysia, on

l

the other hand, was a subject of the British empire and currently a member country of the
Commonwealth. Both countries have an authoritarian developmental state, and they
consider sustained economic growth and development as their primary goal. 12
-;

'

On the other hand, there are fundamental differences between the two countries as
well. Contrary to South Korea, which is almost completely homogenous with the minor

12
Currently Malaysia is a middle-income developing country with annual GDP per capita at the range of
$10,750(PPP). Malaysia as a country resembles by far the Asian Tigers in income distribution and integrity
of the business environment than any other developing country. Malaysia as a country resembles by.far the
Asian Tigers in income distribution and integrity of the business environment more than any other
developing country. South Korea, on the other hand, is one of the Four Dragons of East Asia (Taipei,
Singapore, South Korea, Hong Kong - before the integration with China) with unprecedent~d growth rates.
Emerging out of the Korean war, South Korea had national income comparable to the poorer-countries of
Africa. In 1996 its GDP per capita (in PPP terms) was $14,200, comparable to the income of the poorer
members of the European Union and OECD (Greece and Portugal). To illustrate the tremendous economic
change in South Korea in the time span of 30 years, Korean GDP per capita is eight times' higher than that
of India (CIA Factbook 1997).

13

exception of 20,000 Chinese, Malaysia is a country ethnically divided into three major
groups that at periods have clashed. Until 1969, when theworst ethnically related civil
violence occurred, Malaysia had been relatively stable and peaceful. The ethnic violence
that erupted in Malaysia was related to the dissatisfaction of the local Malays for having a
lower economic status compared to the ethnic Chinese and even the Indians. The critical
socioeconomic element in Malaysia is the disparity between political and economic
status. This is related to ethnic divisions, but also to the division between the rural and
urban population. This unique characteristic of Malaysian politics led to policies of
welfare programs that extensively targeted long-term income distribution to mitigate
political violence that can be threatening to the regime stability (Meerman 1979).
Despite the periods of ethnic strife, Malaysia achieved an economic growth rate
around 7 per cent annually during the period from 1961 through 1976."More recently,
Malaysian economy went to even more impressive rates of economic growth (on average
9 percent in the period from 1988 through 1996). The development plans allowed the
government to utilize the economic resources to redistribute wealth and to alleviate
poverty. Currently the economic crisis in the field of electronics threatened these levels of
economic development, yet foreign investment is still maintained in high levels

(Factbook 1997, Meerman 1995).

14
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Data Source: World Penn Tables v. 5.6

Figure 1. Real GDP per capita for Malaysia and South Korea, 1970-1990

Contrary to Malaysia that ascribed to shared economic growth as a goal from the
very beginning, South Korea chose economic growth, as the predominant goal, pushing
the labor force into an effort comparable to wartime periods. South Korea never
experienced a climactic event of civil violence comparable to that of Malaysia. Political
instability, however, was not unknown in South Korea. In the case of South Korea
political violence took the form of labor strikes and student riots and demonstrations
during the late '70s and early '80s. The fundamental goal of the South Korean
government was economic development. To achieve that goal the government supported
big business and tolerated managerial repression and harsh working conditions imposed
on labor (long hours of work and high rates of industrial accidents were commonplace).

15
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Labor resistance to austerity measures and these policies contributed to the fall of
the Park regime in 1979, while the transition to democracy made it difficult for the
following regimes (Roh Tae Woo) to choose coercion as a policy when it was required. 13
The high levels of economic growth volatility, where periods of double~digit growth
numbers in 1987 and 1988 were followed by single digit numbers (6.8 per cent in 1989),
forced the Kotean government to alter its economic policies. The repression of the
previous decades and the militancy of labor did not allow the choice of policies similar to
·-;

the Japanese ones where labor was incorporated in non-coercive patterns of interaction

j

i
-,I

I
j

with management. South Korea, therefore, could not achieve the pacification and
neutralization of the labor that Japan did. Aside from political repression the other

l

j
j

l

l

possible policy choice was welfare and social development that would have built up
social consensus (Kong 1995, 638-639).

1

Despite the different paths of economic development that the two countries

·t

l
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followed, both countries are interesting cases to explore how economic development

i

interacted with political variables. They provide plenty of evidence on the dilemma that

l

governments face between economic growth and political stability. Provided that the two

I

i
1

:i

processes are interrelated, efficiency (economic growth}must be followed by equity.
Moreover, South Korea and Malaysia are informative cases on how political instability is
related to income distribution.
The policy choices of Malaysia and South Korea are of paramount importance,
since they can be applicable to other countries as well. The shifts in their policies were
relatively uneventful indicating a great capacity and flexibility to adjust to new external
13

Civil violence in the form of riots and active student movement is not unknown in South Korean political
life. Although successfully contained; student movements were prominent in the '60s and early '70s (1965,

16

challenges. They provide useful insights to the following theoretical discussion about the
long-term and the short-term interactive relationship among welfare programs, income
distribution, and the stability of the political regime. As the following analysis shows the
interaction of welfare expenditures with economic and political variables is a complicated
phenomenon that calls for an integrative approach.
· The debate of equity (redistribution of resources to reduce inequalities of wealth)
vs. efficiency (maximum production given available resources) remains an important
issue for economic theory, since Kuznets (1955) and Kaldor (1956) reintroduced the
topic in the mid-fifties. 14 For any modem industrialized state the question of economic
efficiency and social equity touches on the nature of the political and economic
j

institutions that are socially acceptable. The welfare state as an institutional framework is
at the core of the interaction between economic growth and economic equity, which

.•. 1 .
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reflects social justice as well (Baldassari and Piga 1996, 257-258). 15

1

In this context social cohesion implies that th~re is a core of values, perceptions,

1

and beliefs that a critical proportion of the population shares regarding the political
system and the interaction between society and the state. These values permeate different
ethnic, social, religious, or any other type of groups that may divide the society.
A voiding political violence depends on building perceptions that enhance the support of
the population for the political regime. In developed countries, the welfare states were

1972, and 1980).
One of the first studies on this area was Lenski's (1966) theoretical argument that combines the
"functionalist" and the "conflict" school of thought. Lenski argued that countries that do have a surplus
product tend to follow the power distribution in the society, when they distribute the surplus (the conflict_
argument). The surplus is affected by technology, which determines the political and economic structure, as
well (Cutright 1967, 562).
15
Inefficiencies undoubtedly plague the welfare state. Nevertheless, eradicating the welfare state
inefficiencies should not jeopardize the existence of the welfare state.
14
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established to maintain a certain level of income distribution that was socially acceptable
and to build up long-term political consensus.
Marshall, engaged in the study of economics to explore the phenomenon of
poverty and its causes, modified Weber's concept of citizenship to include social rights
out of-humanitarian interest. 16 · Citizenship as a concept precludes this functional role of
membership and participation of heterogeneous individuals in contemporary societies.
Citizenship is related to the right to work, as a form of participation in society. Since
·i

:.1

employment is connected with multiple forms of participation in society, social security
benefits and welfare transfers are a means of supporting segments of the population to
remain active members even when they go through unexpected contingencies, such as
unemployment and illness (Leisink and Coenen 1993). As an outcome of the evolution
of citizen's political and economi~ rights, welfare institutions interact with the political
• dynamics and the level of economic development that prevail within a country. The
effectiveness of the welfare state depends on the level ofefficiency of the political
system. Hence, the institutional structures developed in the effort of providing citizens
with basic economic rights (such as basic income social security transfers), reflect the _
effort to build a social consensus. 17

16

Although a neo-liberal who firmly believed in Say's Law, Marshall's analysis indicated that sometimes
the market was not the most benevolent distributor ofresources. Even though he was reluctant in accepting
government intervention, he argued that improvements in public education and reallocation of resources,
when the market distribution favors lines of production with increasing returns, are desirable (Barber 1991,
193-195).
17
The development of citizenship as an integrative mechanism is related to the evolution of capitalism and
the creation of the natiori states: What becomes critical are the ways that citizenship can evolve under
increasing economic and political integration and migration. The current experiences in international
relations with ethnic conflicts indicate that citizenship remains a concept strongly related to a territorial
unit. Hence, the impact of the international _changes in the domestic arena will be reflected on how the
concept of citizenship and the institi.ttional structures based on it are going to be reformed. The problem
becomes even more obvious with the European integration process and the reaction of citizens to the
progressive reduction of their citizenship rights.
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Although most studies focus on the industrialized countries, where the functional
concept of citizenship is predominant, it is also essential to look at developing countries.
Most of the developed countries share similar institutional and political structures. They
also exhibit a similar pattern of responses to economic and political challenges. On the
other hand, developing countries present a broader range of political and economic
dynamics and a variety of development paths. The goal is to understand over a wider
range of cases how governments administer welfare transfers to achieve thdr political
and economic goals, given economic and social constraints. A study on how welfare
structures interact with political violence and income distribution will be enlightening
both in theory and also in policy implications. There is no clarity within the literature, as
the following section shows, on the different ways these variables interact with each
other. Nevertheless, the distinction is critical for policy making.
Welfare Transfers and Development: A Trade-off or a. Compatible Choice

The literature on the welfare state converges on the single point that there is no
unique factor that can enlighten the evolution of the welfare state. The research is
separated into two large domains of th~oretical explanations. The first group of theories
emphasizes socioeconomic and demographic factors, while the second one underlines the
critical role of political forces internal to the state. 18 All of the arguments presented in
18

Overall, according to the socio-economic theories there are four primary societal developments which
account for the necessary, but not sufficient, conditions that gave rise to the·welfare state: First, the impact
of industrialization that led to the decline of the agricultural and rural populations. Industrial production
created landless workers who concentrated in urban centers (Urbanization). Second, because of
urbanization the workers experienced involuntary unemployment. On the other hand, industrialization
stimulated sustained economic growth at unprecedented levels. Third, demographic changes altered the
composition of the labor force. Infant mortality declined substantially, while life expectancy increased.
Finally, nation states steadily increased their areas of jurisdiction. The state apparatus became more
centralized and organized (Bureaucratization). Civil and political rights expanded to incoi:porate larger
segments of the population (Pierson 1991, 13-14).
For many researchers, whose arguments are embedded in the structural-functionalist theories,
industrialization has been the primary cause of the welfare state. One of the first specialists in the field,
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this chapter underline and integrate the processes that determine the development of the
welfare state and its interaction with political stability and income distribution.
The literature on income distribution has been relatively recent, focusing strictly
on the economic dimensions of redistribution and its effects on economic growth. Aside
from the early works on income distribution and growth during the, fifties, there was
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Harold Wilensky (1975) considered the welfare state to be a response to the new social needs that
industrialization had created. In both capitalist and socialist societies the social and economic
arrangements reflected the technological logic of industrialized production (Pierson 1991, 15-16).
According to Pierson, the industrialist thesis remains important, but it is limited in explaining the evolution
of the welfare state. It only captures the necessary conditions of economic growth and industrialization,
without incorporating the sufficient conditions for the emergence of the welfare state dictated by political
factors. Its unidimensional argument fails to distinguish between the different forms of welfare states
developed in particular societies (Pierson 1991, 18, 21).
The modernization approach is an extension of the industrialization thesis, combining economic
with political factors. The growth of the welfare state is associated with the evolutionary change of society
to more complex and developed forms. The concept of modernization is deeply rooted in the structuralfunctionalist tradition of Emile Durkheim. Moderriization brings specialization and fragmentation in
society. In highly differentiated societies citizenship is the integrative mechanism·ofthe society. Under
comprehensive citizenship, civil rights are related to property rights and political freedoms (Flora and Alber
1981, 39-40). The modernization approach considers the welfare state as the outgrowth of two processes:
the development of the industrial society and the emergence of mass democracy with universal political and
social citizenship. Due to the complexity of the applied models in the modernization literature, empirical
research is limited with few exceptions (e.g., Flora and Alber 1981). ·
'
Despite the significance of the demographic factors on socio-economic variables, few re.search
designs have isolated their impact on governments' expenditure patterns. The age structure of a population
not only determines the level of public expenditures but also the types of programs and services that the
state provides. In developed countries, the aging population brings an increase in pensions, a significant
component ·of welfare. transfers. Being politically active, the aged population acquires significant political
power through democratic procedures that facilitate the influence of policy-makers (Pampel and
Williamson 1989, 165-168). Scholars have voiced two different positions on the subjects of political
factors and the welfare state. One group of them emphasizes societal political forces. In this school of
thought there is the power resources model by Korpi (1989) and the working class-strength th~ory
developed by Shalev (1987). 18 The power resources model recognizes that power processes are mobilized
in different ways in the political and economic spheres. Despite variations,· the primary premise of these
models is that the welfare.state is the outcome of class-based political struggles designed to stimulate state
intervention in favor of the working class (Pierson 1991, 29-31).
The second ·group of scholars, who focus on political factors, assumes that state actors have their
own interests in promoting welfare programs. The state representatives seek reelection, and welfare
programs provide them with popular support. This category of theoretical models includes the public
choice models, which emphasize the role of the bureaucratic apparatus in determining the welfare state's
size (Skocpol 1985, Orloff and Skocpol 1984, Skocpol and Amenta 1986). Demographic and economic
changes create diversified groups, which articulate their interests via electoral participation. Welfare
development is the outcome of political struggles between opposing ideological groups (Usui 1994). To
bring political harmony the government needs to satisfy their demands. Thus, according to the bargaining
approach the welfare institutions are emerging as the outcome of the bargaining between the government
and the various demographic and political groups. These fundamentally long-term processes shaped
welfare states though the years, by altering the economic structures and the bargaining process among the
various groups and the government. Two of these processes are of primary importance, the increasing
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limited research on that issue until recently. The theoretical neglect of income
distribution is partly due to the lack of sufficient theoretical interest, despite the traditions
of the Ricardian and.Marxist economics. Although income distribution was a primary
issue in both Marx and Ricardo's writings, their theoretical arguments did not exhibit any
forecasting ability, because income shares of production factors have being unstable over
time. · On the other hand, for marginalist economists, income distribution was a secondary
aspect of economics (Baldassari and Piga 1996, 261 ).
Only when macroeconomic theories revised their microeconomic foundations, did
.J

income distribution and its impact on the efficient production frontier become popular
.·,

j

topics for analysis. Moreover, the current studies depart from Kuznet's line of argument
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by emphasizing the impact of income distribution on the rate of growth of income, rather
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than looking at the interaction between level of income and income distribution. 19 Most
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of the income distribution-growth literature (Alesina and Rodrik (1991, 1994); Perotti
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(1993, 1996)) look at the effects of an unequal.distribution on economic growth .
The models developed by Alesina and Rodrik (1991, 1994), Persson and Tabellini
(1994), and Perotti (1993) look at the impact·ofincome distribution on economic growth
through the medium of tax collection by the public sector. Taxation crowds out
investment necessary for economic growth. Nevertheless, as Alesina and Rodrik (1994),
argue the trade-off occurs because taxation is not solely oriented for income
redistribution but for productive public spending as well.
levels of urbanization and the increasing numbers of the dependent population.
19
The predominant view among economists is that greater inequality positively affects the level of taxation
and redistribution. Any transfer of income from the more weli-off to the less well-off reduces the
availability of income to be appropriated for investment. Thus, less capital is accumulated and the rate of
· growth is slower. Most of the economic models use as theoretical foundation the median voter theorem and
assume the democratic processes. Another precondition of these models is that the agents are
heterogeneous, although not all authors agree on the factors (Baldassari and Piga 1996, 263). There are
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In an earlier article Alesina and Rodrik ( 1991) endogenized governmental
policies. Their effort was to extend the growth literature and create a link between the
growth literature and literature on majority voting on tax rates by Romer (1975), and
Meltzer and Richard (1981) (Alesina and Rodrik 1991, 3). 20 The primary implication of
their model was that the regime type, the distribution of wealth, and the levels of
economic growth are interrelated. Govemmentschave to choose a level of growth that is
not optimal but socially acceptable. 21 Moreover, the distribution_ofwealth is more
beneficial when it occurs from the wealthiest quintile of the population to the middle
segments of the population (Alesina and Rodrik 1991·, 29). 22
Overall, the economic models address the issue of equity-wealth as a trade-off
rather than a political choice. The level of development of the society determines the
type of relation between the two variables. Equity becomes a precondition for economic
growth only after a certain level of development has been obtained. The more intense the
redistribution process is, the heavier the taxation is on the wealthier groups.
Consequently, redistribution causes disincentives to investment, and through lower levels
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several paths through which income distribution affects the rate of economic growth.
The study of the redistributive functions of government has attracted a plethora of public choice theorists.
The most interesting theoretical work comes from Meltzer and Richard (1978, 1981), Aranson and
Ordeshook (I 981 ), and Peltzman (1980). Meltzer and Richard argue that the increase in suffrage and the
income inequality have determined the growth of government in the last two centuries. On the other hand,
Pelztman, although he agrees on other grounds with Meltzer and Richard, argues that education and high
levels of income equality determine the large size of the government. Peltzman's argument is not based on
the median voter theorem. In his model, the political candidates compete among each other for votes and
promise higher income distribution in favor of their supportive coalitions (Mueller 1991, 327-330).
Meltzer, Richard, and Peltzman assume a vertical redistribution of resources. They also suppose
that the beneficiaries of government growth (e.g., public employees) support the expansion of
governmental functions. Both assumptions were ·challenged on the grounds that redistribution is neither
strictly vertical, nor are the attitudes of the public employees different from those of the majority of the
population. The redistributive role of the government is an important determinant of government size, but
not the sole factor (Mueller 1991, 332-333).
_.
21
Growth does not have a normative connotation in their work. Accumulation of wealth does not imply a
welfare improvement for all the segments of the population. .
22
In their article the authors emphasized 'distribution of wealth' rather than 'distribution of personal
income'.
20
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of investment it has a negative impact on economic growth.
Political;Stability and Income Distribution: Are they linked?
It is fairly well established that political stability and economic growth are also

interconnected (Barro 1991, Alesina, Roubini, Ozier, and Swagel 1992). Very few
researchers have actually connected income distribution with political stability. Muller's
(1985) article deals with regime type,income inequality, and political violence. The
critical question is whether income inequality causes political violence regardless of level
of development. If income inequality does not have any significant effect·on the level of
political violence, then any highly developed country should not consider income
inequality as a political issue. 23
Muller concludes that there is a definite positive relationship between political
instability (he limits his indicator to deaths from violence) and income inequality. His
results confirrp. that a country cannot emphasize economic growth, while ignoring the
macro-economic effects of income inequality. Moreover, intermediary regimes (in terms
ofresponsiveness) are prone to political violence compared to those that have either low
or high levels of political violence (Muller 1985, 60).
The relationship between political violence, income distribution, and welfare
expenditures is critical, since it determines the extent to which income inequality causes
political violence. Despite the significance of political violence on the regime stability
and sustained economic development, most of the current studies on income distribution
and development tend to restrict its use in their empirical studies (Benabou 1996, 3-4).
23

Studies have concluded that the relation between income inequality and political violence is spurious,
while controlling for levels of economic development (Hardy 1979; Nagel 1974; Weede 1981). The .
literature is divided in two camps on whether political violence is the outcome of discontent or that of
"resource mobilization", and the organizational structure of the general dissatisfaction (Muller 1985, 48).
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The relationship between political instability and income distribution is a rather elaborate
one.

24

There is no indication that extreme inequality is the necessary and sufficient

condition for political violence to ignite. Perceptions of what is the actual level of
deprivation of the various groups are also crI.tical and they needto be present for an
unequal distribution to lead to political violence .
. Generally speaking levels of political deprivation, income inequality, and other
forms of social and political decline are not important as independent events. The
relationship between political stability and economic development is even more
controversial.

25

What is critical is how people perceive and measure their living

standards with their conceptions of how life should be. It is not a coincidence that major
revolutions (such as English, French, Russian) did occur in periods of economic uprising.
Although higher economic growth should be inhibitive of revolutionary trends or other
forms of civil unrest, by itself is not sufficient to preclude civil violence, if segments of
the population believe that their living standards are declining (Davies 1962, Brinton
1938, Chong 1991, 236-237). 26
Collective action literature provides an explanation on why in cases of extreme
inequality, levels of political instability are lower.· Any type ofrevolution or organized
form of civil violence is a collective action and as such, it is subject to the well-known
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There are an ext~nsive number of articles that deal with the issue of socio-economic stability and that
follow the argument that socio-political stability affects income distribution through property rights
alterations. For more information about this literature see Alesina and Perotti (1996) and Gupta (1990).
25
The studies by Alesina, Ozier, Roubini, and Swagel (1992) and Londregan and Poole (1990) reach
opposite conclusions. The former study concludes that major political instability can lead to low economic
· growth, whereas growth has no impact on governmental instability. The latter study supports that there is
no evidence in favor of the hypothesis that political instability reduces economic growth, rather that low
economic growth reduces the probability that governments·will survive (Feng 1999).
26
This is critical of the future of many developing countries in this period of globalization. Globalization as
a process may or may not cause serious economic and political problems within developing countries, but
how segments of the population perceive that globalization affects their lives is important to their
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problems of collective action. For any group to organize the participants must feel
socially obligated to actively participate. Political mobilization requires both strong
organization and leadership. The ability of the organizers to effectively lead the
population to win the necessary economic and political concessions by the government is
critical (Chong 1991, 232-236).
· In developing countries, most of the leaders ofrevolutions come from the middle
class, since they are the ones that have the resources and the educational background to
provide the necessary organization. Without access to means of communication and to
institutional structures, an effective organization is not possible. In developing countries
the middle class is the one that has the accesses necessary to achieve an effective
organization. Their cooperation and support to the political system is essential for long
term political stability to be maintained. On the other hand, their dissatisfaction with the
political system can lead to different paths of political activities.27
Integrating the Welfare State with the Political Variables
Within the context of public choice theories, North and Weingast (1989), Miller
(1989), Shepsle (1979, 1991), and Calvert (1995) have emphasized the significant role of
institutions in the enforcement of the state' laws. Institutions have several interpretations
in social sciences. Most of the interpretations are restatements or specifications of the
broad definition by Durkheim: "all the beliefs and modes of conduct instituted by
collectivity" (Durkheim 1895, lvi). For Durkheim, social facts (e.g., moral rules) are
independent of individual entities and place constraints on individual behavior.
Durkheim perceived that integration and solidarity are the outcomes of patterned
responses.
For more theoretical information on the background movements' organization look at Gurr's Why men
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interaction, which impede anomie. In developed societies organic solidarity develops out
of the individual differences, since functional differentiation increases the
interdependence ofthe individuals (Corse 1977, 129-132; Calvert 1995, 217)~
The rational choice approach to institutions moves away from Durkheim's
collectivism, emphasizing the significance of individual actors in shaping institutions.
The firstapproach perceives institutions as constraints, rules of the game that restrict
individual behavior (North 1981, 1990; Shepsle 1979; North·and Weingast 1989). The
..
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second one conceives institutions as equilibrium outcomes of an underlying social game.
Both approaches deal with specific cases of social games. Voluntary exchange is the:
primary mechanism for the selection of a new competitive equilibrium and the goal is the
reduction of transaction costs (Knight 1995). A third approach, recently developed,
emphasizes the bargaining process among actors in establishing institutions (Bates 1989,
Miller 1992, Knight 1992).
The bargaining approach is broader and tries to explain why different institutional
outcomes emerge from various alternatives. The foundation is individual (or group) selfinterest, but the analytical emphasis is on the distributional differences of the various
institutional alternatives (Knight 1995, 107-108). Knight argues that asymmetries in the
ownership of resources reflect the bargaining power of the actors (in this case societal
groups or classes) during their social interactions.28 What becomes a necessary

rebel (1971), Hirschman Exit, voice, and loyalty (1970), Kriesberg The sociology ofsocial conjlict{l973).
28
During each interaction, a variety of factors determines the availability ofresources. The resources of the
actors do not dissipate after each bargaining process, rather they may be used to accomplish another
bargaining round with other actors. Furthermore, the ownership of resources affects the actors' attitudes
. towards risk. The higher the cost from not coordinating, the more risk averse an actor is. Actors who are
expecting to lose less tend to be more risk acceptant. Commitment to specific institutional outcomes
becomes a function of actors' resources and capabilities to choose among alternatives. Rational actors
adjust their behavior through various social interactions until equilibrium is reached (Knight 1995, 109110).
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ingredient for institutions to be viable is cooperation among the various agents.
Cooperation implies-that even if the immediate act has a negative effect, there are indirect
benefits for all the participants (the most ext~eme case is the prisoner's dilemma). 29
There are two advantages of the bargaining approach. First, it allows for
distributional-differences between the various institutional designs. Second, according to
the distribution of resources, the actors·competeto choose the most advantageous social
institution. Because of these characteristics, the bargaining approach is useful to analyze
a wide range of social institutions. In the case of welfare institutions, the goal of
governments is assumed to be the desire to maintain a relatively stable political system.
On the other hand, citizens or segments of the population aim at maintaining basic socioeconomic rights. Hence, the bargaining process occurs between various social groups
and the state.
Without a doubt, the state has a monopoly on coercing the citizens and extracting
resources. Nevertheless, the government must ensure that the process does not
undermine the political system in the long run. To do so, the government bargains with
the citizens in providing them with security and other services in return for the citizens'
contribution of the required resources (North and Weingast 1989, 806-807). In this
implicit bargain between the government and the citizenry, welfare programs function as
the institution for the government to exhibit its commitment to the bargaining rules.
To achieve its goals, a government builds sustainable coalitions to obtain
resources from the society at the minimum possible cost. For these coalitions to be
29

Even more significant is that cooperation does not imply that the_institutional design is the most efficient,
yet it permeates both informal and formal social institutions. Although the literature on cooperative
equilibrium is still rudimentary, studies have shown that cooperation provides multiple opportunities and
complicated interactions among the participants Calvert (1995). For more extensive study of the literature
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viable, the governing elites must be able to reach larger segments of the population. The
government provides the citizens with security and other services in return for the
citizens' contribution of the required resources (Organski 1996). 30
This complementary perspective on the welfare state has two areas of exploration.
The first one is related to the wage distribution literature, and it focuses on the impact of
welfare expenditures on workers' incentives (Fitoussi 1996, 337). 31 The second area of
concentration focuses on the positive externalities that government programs on
education, public health, and public investment can have on economic development.
This study expands the research on the second area, by integrating the bargaining theory
with the concept ofrelative political capacity.
A Critique of the Economic Models
The integrating approach on the welfare state contradicts the theoretical
arguments and the implications of the literature applying economic models. Although
economic equality is associated with higher levels of economic development, the
dominant perception is that societies face a trade-off between equity and efficiency. If
the society chooses growth as its ultimate goal, the efforts to maintain or improve income
distribution will become detrimental to the success of the efficiency objective. The
economic models have three shortcomings. First, by applying the median voter theorem,

on cooperation and coordination in game theory see Crawford and Haller (1990), and Banks and Calvert
(1992).
30
During the early years of European history, the rulers had an incentive to validate the existing terms of
bargaining, so they could extract the resources necessary to wage war. Institutions arose to enhance
compliance with the bargaining rules and secure the private economic and political rights of the citizens
(North and Weingast 1989, 808). Dealing with threatening situations, governments needed not only the
majority of the citizens to contribute to the common effort, but also to establish domestic social discipline.
In return, the government provided security for the citizens.30 - This line of argument can extend to similar
implications with the complementary perspective on the welfare state.
31
Of course the antithesis is that welfare state creates disincentives to save, choose assets, and build
entrepreneurial spirit.
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the authors automatically restrict their research to democracies and they limit the
individual preferences that are acceptable (Baldassari and Piga 1996, 267). The second
problem is the lack of consideration that welfare programs often exhibit characteristics of
public goods (e.g., vaccination). Government expenditures or programs can create
positive externalities, particularly on public health and human capital, which enhance
economic development and growth. 32 The third limitation is the assumption that income
redistribution is strictly targeting the lower economic layers in society. 33
Nevertheless, this assumption is rather ambitious and contradictory to empirical
reality. The welfare state, however, does not always function for the benefit of the less
well-off. Non-poor social and economic layers have their own direct benefits from
welfare programs that they maintain through the use of welfare. Goodin and Le Grand
(1987) emphasize that the word 'redistribution' acquires a different meaning, as some
welfare programs function as 'redistribution over the life cycle.' That implies that
transfers are not always from the well-off to the less fortunate, but that they offer security
to the well-off themselves. The best example is contributions for pensions. At the end of
the working day the same amount ofeamings, held from employees, will have been
transferred back to them when they retire.

32

Aside from the economic models that are based on micro-economic structures, there are very few macroeconomic models that try to capture income inequality by analyzing industrialization and its impact in
occupational differentiation. The argument of this literature is that the growing middle class acquires
bargaining power due to industrialization. The relationship, however, is not linear but curvilinear,
indicating that higher growth rates in combination with greater population rates lead to greater inequality.
Nevertheless, most of the early macro-economic studies used inappropriate measures of income inequality
and their empirical findings were inconsistent (Stack 1980, 274-275). For some of these studies look at
Jackman (1975); Cutright (1967); and Paukert (1973).
33
Public choice scholars assume that redistribution of economic and social resources has a strictly vertical motion from the higher to the lower strata. For example Meltzer-Richard (1978, 1981) and Peltzman (1980)
contradict each other empirically regarding the impact of income equality on government size.
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Most of the public choice models, which are based on Becker's seminal model
(1981 ), follow the premise that democratic processes bolstered the welfare programs. 34
If this argument holds, the politically active middle income groups should benefit more

than lower income groups, since the latter tend to be less organized. Tullock (1970)
argues that the voting process affects the redistributive decisions. 35 Poor people, usually,
represent the majority ofthe voting population more than well-to-do segments of the
society. On the other hand, poor people have less political power: Moreover, for a party
to win, the poor people's vote is not sufficient, and middle-class votes are also necessary
(Barr 1993, 86-87).
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Thus, welfare programs function as insurance for people who are

poor for a small fraction of their lives (Goodin and Le Grand 1996, 5-6). 37
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The most recent empirical ~orlcs on the impact of interest groups and political fractionalization on
government's size include a study by Mueller and Murrell (1986). Mueller and Murrell picture a political
system where competing parties provide interest groups with benefits and services in exchange for their
electoral support.. Their findings support the theoretical argument that interest groups and the percentage of
the population that votes positively affect the size of the government. However, contrary to Meltzer's and
Richard's theoretical assumptions, the redistribution caused by interest groups' activities goes from the
poor to the rich. The total size of the population has a negative impact on government size. The authors
consider this result noteworthy because it indicates that the government's role is not strictly
redistributional. Government provisions have the quality of a public good (Mueller and Murrell 1986, 141142).
35
The argument that the middle classes disproportionally benefit from welfare programs was first
articulated by Tullock (1970, 1971 ). This hypothesis converges with the theoretical_ argument by Peltzman
on the role that economic equality has on governmentsize. Moreover, as Peltzman (1976) and Stigler
(1971) argue any form of regulation which is the outcome of interest groups' activities, ends up as
extraction of monopoly rents (Barr 1993, 94).
36
Williamson and Pampel (1986) argued that in many countries the increase in welfare expenditures can be
explained by the political power of the middle class rather than the strength of the working class.
37
An extensive study of both developed and developing countries by the International Labor Office shows
that in developing countries the whole population does not benefit equally from public expenditures. "Two
critical reasons are that the decision making process is remote from most of the population, and the
differences between rural and urban populations. The majority of poor households are located in rural
areas, hence, they receive less support compared to those in developed countries (Lecaillon, Paukert,
Morisson and Germidis 1984, 128-130). A more detailed analysis of itemized public expenditures in
specific countries (Chile, Colombia, Panama, Puerto Rico, Hong Kong, Iran, Malaysia, Philippines, Sri
Lanka, Canada, and the United States) indicates that not all types of public expenditures enhance
redistribution. For instance, at face value social welfare expenditures are most progressive. However, if the
composition of the expenditure is specified, then it is revealed that the largest percentages of social welfare
transfers are pensions. Most of the developing countries' recipients of pensions are civil servants, who
belong to middle or even higher income groups. In reality, the relatively poor segments of the population
receive a much smaller proportion of the social welfare transfers. Similar trends can be identified in health
expenditures. Moreover, public expenditures on mining, industry, and transportation are neutral, having no
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Despite the positive effects that welfare programs have in maintaining a minimum
income, the initial distribution ofresources prohibits a more egalitarian transfer that will
have a progressive effect on income distribution. In Latin American countries, the
middle class benefits the most from the welfare programs. Recent studies in Brazil,
Uruguay and other countries show that around 40 per cent of the poorest segments of the
population received only 18 per cent of welfare transfers and 8 percent of social security
benefits. The middle income groups, however, received 70 per cent and 35 per cent of
these resources respectively. In the Dominican Republic the wealthiest families receive
60 per cent of health care benefits and pensions. Pensions,in particular have a severely
regressive effect on income distribution. In Chile, despite the efforts to extend the
welfare coverage, 30 per cent of the working force remains outside the welfare system.
In Venezuela, a more extreme case, the actual transfer is from the workers to the state,
since the pension at the end is much lower than the initial contributions (Mesa-Lago
1991, 200; Hauseman and Rigobon 1993, 10-11).
Furthermore, if interest groups,are significant forces in shaping the size of the
welfare state, this unequal distribution ofresources is magnified. The role of interest
groups is usually associated with increasing industrialization and specialization. Both
processes create transaction costs. According to Becker's model (1983), interest groups
function as both an efficiency-enhancing and redistributive mechanism. Nevertheless,
public choice theories have emphasized that distributional coalitions enhance inequality
(Pampel and Williamson 1989, 168-169). The more organized the groups are, the more
successfully they capture the distributional effects of government policies. Thus, the

effect on income inequality. Finally expenditures on higher education are regressive (Lecaillon, Paukert,
Morisson and Germidis 1984, 166-168).
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distribution of welfare benefits does not always correspond to the needs of all the
segments of the population. 38
Most of the public choice theoretical arguments provide valuable insights
regarding the political processes that determine government size. Nevertheless, most of
the models are static in nature, focusing on equilibrium relationships in democratic and
developed societies·(Mueller 1991, 337). They fail to·capturethe long-term process in
which democratic procedures and interest group activities shape the size of the
government.
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What these models fail to distinguish is between short and long-term goals that
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governments may have. The actual goals of welfare policy are not always clearly defined
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by the existing studies. 39 In the previous section income distribution and building
consensus were considered the two principal functions of welfare state. It was also
suggested that depending on the time-frame, building social consensus is complemen4try,
and not antithetical, to the redistribution of resources. An efficient welfare state in the
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long-run should reduce inequality or at least maintain an .acceptable level of economic
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differences among the various groups. Through its effect oneincome distribution, the
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welfare state can support the stability of the political system. It should be expected that
states·with high levels ofrelative political capacity can harmonize their long-term
political and economic goals to achieve sustainable economic growth. The short-term
38

Another possible explanation of distributional inequalities or inefficiencies is the distance from the
source of the services. The proposed explanation is that the financial and time cost of travelling affects
lower income population more than higher income (Goodin, Legrand, and Gibson 1987, 130-131). Of
course this explanation could corroborate why distributional inequalities exist between rural and urban
populations in developing countries.
39
· Landau (1986) tried to identify whether government expenditures on various areas stimulate economic
growth in LDCs. In most cases, government expenditures did not have any significant effect on growth.
However, he ignored the possible.indirect effects that government expenditures (educational expenditures,
public investment) may have. He also failed to consider the differences between government consumption
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effects of the welfare state, however, may differ quite significantly, since in the short-run
welfare programs target political stability as the primary goal. If there is a harmony
between long-term and short-term goals, then the impact of the welfare state could
actually be indirectly positive to long-term sustained economic growth. Due to
increasing demand for socio-economic security, the role of the state has been modified to
secure a constant flow of social services rather than providing emergency relief (e.g.,
Poor Laws).

:!

A Model of Welfare Transfers and Economic Development
The basic assumption of this study is that an efficient government builds the
necessary social consensus to support a stable political environment conducive to
economic development. Doing so, governments use the welfare state programs to
integrate segments of the population under the sweeping concept of "social citizenship."
Thus, under the presented theoretical framework, the most critical function of the welfare
state would be to protect the political system against disruptive changes of the political
· system. Political instability is often the outcome of an unequal distribution of economic
and political power within the society. Welfare institutions-intervene and alter the
original allocation of resources in the society. The government mitigates social
grievances to promote political stability, interfering with the efficient but often socially
unacceptable distribution of income in the market (Scully 1991, 200).
A variety of activities from protests and strikes to more extreme forms of riots and
revolutions determine the degree of political violence and the survivability of a political
system. For any government, controlling political instability remains a practical goal.
Aside from the eradication of the causes of political instability, it is common practice
and welfare expenditures, or other more directly distributive government expenditures.
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among all types of political systems to assemble the population around institutions, which
are acceptable either to a significant majority or to politically essential segments of the
population. Welfare institutions were created as a response to the likelihood of political
violence (Germany) or as an effort to unite the whole population in the common effort of
warfare (England). Thus, welfare programs constitute an effort by states to build social
cohesion and reduce the possibility of political violence through bargaining with the most
critical groups for their survival.

If we accept the argument that welfare programs reflect an attempt to create social
cohesion, along with redistributing resources, then we can explore how the state uses its
programs to promote sustained economic growth. This trend is not unidimensional, but it
reflects the capacity of the state to interact with domestic and external economic and
demographic factors. Given the prior discussion on long-term and short-term goals of the
welfare state, I argue that in the short-run, within two years maximum, the states
redistribute resources to avoid immediate political crisis that are disruptive to the
economic and political system. This type of redistribution is clearly focusing on building
a consensus. If governments are interested in long-term stability and economic growth,
i

then the redistribution of resources will target the politically relevant groups for the
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government's survival. In this case the type of income redistribution will be
institutionalized and the created welfare state will be an elaborate system of institutions
that through positive externalities can positively enhance political and economic
development.
As Figure 2 shows, the long-term political goals of income distribution and
political stability are strongly related to the level of economic development. As the
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literature indicates, each variable is a critical part of the larger puzzle regarding the
choices that governments make. Although trade-offs are present in any system, this line
of reasoning does not always circumscribe social choices. As it is mentioned earlier,
acquiring social cohesion is often a by-product of government intervention. Thinking
strictly in Manichaeah terms, one ignores the possible existence of such by-products.
Thus, the indirect impact of government intervention, which can capture the positive
externality of the welfare state, is usually ignored in the literature.
Welfare State
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Figure 2. Welfare Transfers and Economic Development

The socio-economic theories consider the welfare state to be a response to both
industrialization and increasing democratization. Both processes alter fundamental social

a

structures and create the necessity of mechanism that integrates society (modernization
argument). All of the original theoretical frameworks suggest that the initial role of the
welfare state was to build the necessary social cohesion for sustained economic
development. In this context I argue that instead of focusing ori the redistributive
.function of the welfare state, research should look at its function to maintain political
stability. Income redistribution becomes a complementary function rather the primary
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goal of welfare transfers. In simple terms governments do not redistribute resources
because they desire an equitable distribution of wealth, but because they desire to remain
in power. Hence, the redistribution will target groups that are politically critical. If
governments desire to drastically alter the redistribution of resources, other means such
as planned agricultural reforms are more appropriate and efficient.
In this-line ofreasoning it makes more sense that the goals of welfare state will be
short-term. Why do governments even bother to be engaged in long.:.term programs?
Going back to tlie principles of the bargaining model, for governments to alter the
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planning horizon of the various social groups and to prevent them from perceiving
political violence as a viable option, it is necessary to alter their own incentive structure
through strong commitment to political and economic redistribution.
In more socially homogenous societies the need to build organic solidarity is less
critical than in socially heterogenous societies. Hence, the time frame that governments
are willing to commit to the redistribution of resources varies according to the levels of
heterogeneity within critical social institutions and their overall level of development.
The critical variable to determine the type of welfare policies a government wants to
follow is the time preference and the power asymmetries of both the government and the
social groups, as well as how far they are willing to commit and build-up a social
consensus.
All things being equal, strong governments, where the opposition is weak and
non-threatening and they do not feel the pressure to alter the planning horizons of their
support groups, will choose less elaborate welfare programs that target short-term
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problems of political violence.

40

Hence this type of government, regardless of political

regime, has short time preferences and low level of commitment.
On the other hand, governments that face strong opposition and continuous
challenges to their authority cannot efficiently function without building a consensus first
among the critical groups to sustain the political system. In such cases the governments
need to alter the time preference of the various social groups, where political violence is
not a desirable goal in the long-run. As the bargaining theory of institutions and public
choice theories on property rights show, governments need to signal long-term
commitment to national political stability. And once again it is necessary to emphasize
that the degree of commitment is with respect to politically relevant groups.
England established modem welfare programs only during WWI, when the need
to bring in the whole population to the war effort was imperative. Without the fear of
war, Poor Laws were the furthest the ·British government was willing to provide the
citizens. Germany, on the other hand, was barely one unified state when Bismarck was
faced with problems of labor demands. At that time period it was necessary for the
German government to enact laws that will enhance the long-term stability of the
country. This argument can extend to developing countries as well. It is even more
relevant as the currently developing countries have to make even faster policy choices
between domestic goals and external pressures. The cases of Malaysia and South Korea
elaborate the different time preferences and degree of commitment in the government
policy choices and the dilemma they face between competitiveness and socio-political
40
There are several definitions of 'strong government', in the context of this study, however, it is relevant
to define as a 'strong government' one that has a lot of bargaining power and resources with respect to the
competing socio-economic groups. In this case governments that need a smaller supportive coalition to
remain in power or governments that rule over relatively homogenous societies are considered stronger
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stability.

3. Malaysia and South Korea
As Sarel ( 1998) argues the Asian 'miracles' are hardly miraculous if the initial
conditions of economic development are taken into consideration. Either in the form of
agrarian reforms or through welfare, health, and educational transfers a reduction of
obstructions to economic growth inequalities was pursued._ Even in South Korea where
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growth was the primary goal, an extensive agrarian reform occurred first. Both South
Korea and Malaysia have one of the lowest Gini coefficients among developing
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countries. Political and economic development was not a linear path of modernization,
but the outcome of policies that balance out domestic and external goals. Political
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violence is not unknown to either country, yet both countries managed to avoid a spiral
effectofpolitical violence and economic underdevelopment. Moreover, the comparative
analysis of the two countries shows how governments with different time preferences and
bargaining power choose different paths· of social and economic development.
The two cases elaborate that income inequality by itself is not a sufficient cause
for the government to experience civil violence. Perceptions of people regarding the ·
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quality of their lives can be actually more critical in conjunction with deep cleavages in
the society (rural vs. urban, ethnic divisions, labor vs. management) can be explosive.
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The two cases corroborate that welfare transfers remain one of the many tools that
governments use to accommodate the public' dissatisfaction, or that of specific groups
(labor in South Korea) and alter their planning horizon where political violence is not an
attractive option.

than others, hence less willing to commit in the long-run.
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Welfare transfers are not the unique mechanism to build up consensus, health
expenditures and education are two other mechanisms that are even more efficient in the
long-run as the case of Malaysia shows. Nevertheless, welfare transfers can be faster in
implementation. Thus, welfare transfers are particularly applied in the short-run to
eliminate phenomena of political violence, like in South Korea during the '80s. Welfare
transfers can actually accentuate income inequality, if other measures are not taken to
satisfy the longer term goal of smoothing income distribution. The health expenditures in
·.·i
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Malaysia and the agrarian reform in South Korean are two possible solutions.
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The Korean Case
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The homogeneity of the population allowed the South Korean governments to follow
rather repressive policies, particularly towards labor. For South Korea's economic
planners the ultimate priority was to grow economically. Redistribution was a secondary
issue. Moreover, the initial agrarian reform provided South Korea already with a
relatively lower income inequality _compared to other developing countries. Hence, the
South Korean governments did not develop the preference of socially responsive policies
and the long-term policy did not match the short-term efforts to-alleviate political
instability.
Nevertheless, in the long run the South Korean case shows the deleterious effects
that rapid economic growth may have on the society and the political system. For South
Korean governments, civil unrest was a factor of labor militancy and students' demands
for more democratic procedures. The inclusion of welfare policies was a response to the
social pressures towards the state. As public choice models predict, the increasing
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democratization allowed channels of interest articulation and aggregation via civil unrest
(riots and strikes).
At the end of the Korean war (1953), South Korea was a devastated country with
GDP per capita of$67. In less that 20 years Korea achieved tremendous rates of
economic growth. Meanwhile, politically the Syngman Rhee government was becoming
-increasingly autocratic, while Western values were embedded into the educational
system. The clash between an autocratic regime and the democratic...,ideals of the students
-led to riots and uprisings that resulted in the end of the Rhee regime and a coup in 1961.41
Nevertheless, the military regime lay the foundations for the economic development and
it was progressively transformed into a civilian government in 1963. What also happened
during the late '50s and the early '60s was an agrarian reform under the au~pices of the
United States as well. The agrarian reform altered the initial redistribution of re~ources,
allowing for faster economic growth. The success of the agrarian reform was partly due
to the strength and the commitment of the regime. (Kong 1995, 632-633).The Park regime (1961-1979) created the Economic Planning Board (EPB) to
promote the five year plan of economic development. Similar to Malaysia, the priority in
:j

South Korea was to build a well-trained and efficient bureaucracy: And similarto
Malaysia, the private sector was protected and considered as co-partner in the effort to
build up the Korean economy. Thus, the Park regime chose to signal personal and
institutional commitment to the private sector that the government would play by the
rules. To make that commitment credible the government decided to intervene only
when it was necessary and government interventions were predictable. The Korean

41

It is interesting in the case of Korea that the mobilization for education did contribute to the many
incidents of civil violence, where the students have been the primary initiators.
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government chose economic growth as the primary goal and all policies were targeted
toward higher rates of economic growth (Root 1996). The driving force behind any
developmental policy was the statethat played a particularly dominant role, and the large
businesses (chaebols). 42
The problem with the first development plan was that it produced imbalanced
economic growth and it aggravated imbalances between sectors. The emphasis on
export-oriented industrialization created a gap between export-oriented businesses and
:i
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those that were domestically oriented. Furthermore, imbalances between urban and rural
populations were persistent as well. To resolve these problems the Korean government
tried to strengthen agriculture with low-interest rate loans and intervened with the price
of rice to reduce the income inequality between urban and city residents (Lee 1996, 2021).
In the 1970s despite the two oil shocks, th.e collapse of the Bretton Woods'
system, and the weakening of the international trade, South Korea continued its economic
expansion. It actually gained momentum by participating in projects with other
developing countries in Asia and the Middle East. On the other hand, while the
manufacturing sector was restructured and leading the acceleration of economic growth,
the government could not adjust the prices of the agricultural products. As a result the
gap between the rural and the urban sectors increased. Inflationary trends and
inefficiencies caused by the chemical and heavy industries endangered the perspectives
of economic growth. The Korean government tried to moderate the rate of economic
42

The structural changes that took place in the '60s under the Park regime transformed the Korean
economy from an agricultural one to a semi-industrialized and currently to an industrialized one. The share
of manufacturing in gross domestic product rose from around 13 per cent in 1961 to 28 per cent in 1974,
while the share of agriculture dropped from 40 per cent to 25 per cent during the same period. The
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growth with the third development plan (1972-1976). The emphasis was not strictly on
economic growth but rather on" harmony in growth". During the following decade there
was a switch in the economic policies with an emphasis on economic stabilization, a
rather weak point in Korean development (Lee 1996, 21-22; Hasan 1976, 8). Price
stability, market liberalization, balance between heavy industries and small businesses
were the primary goals (e;g., tariffs declined continuously from 21 per cent in 1985 to 8
per cent in 1993). Moreover, the service sector started developing. Mismanagement of
the economic plans led to critical delays and an aging manufacturing sector, although the
Korean economy was able to switch to an open economy with finance and trade
liberalization (Kwon 1990, xxii; Lee 1996, 30-33).
The Korean society discovered that growth and political stability are two
complementary rather than antithetical goals. Even more critical is that without prior
institutional and political stability rapid growth can cause instability. This is true
particularly for transitional periods as most of the Korean regimes· experienced with the .
student riots and later on with the labor stoppages and strikes. Part of the_ problem of
Korean policies was the effort to fix and deal with the obvious economic problems rather
than to address structural problems. The agrarian reform performed by the early regimes
was a critical structural reform that reduced income inequality and had beneficial effects
for the rapid economic growth that Korea experienced in the '60s and the '70s. Another
critical issue here is how people perceived the business cycles that began to occur in the
Korean economy (Lee 1996. 44-45). The incidents of civil violence during the '80s
corroborate that business cycles produce massive pessimism in the society, and threaten

industrialization process was followed by a rise in wages and a decline in unemployment from 8.2 per cent
in 1963 to 4.1 in 1974 (Hasan 1976, 4).
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the stability of the political system. Once the stability of the political system is
undermined, the levels of investment may decline.
The Park regime (1961-1979) and the Chun regime that followed (1980-7) tried to
i

deal with the increasing problems. The Park and Chun regimes chose to build up first the
economic foundations of the society and then to allow for democratization, which
became inevitable with the advancement of capitalism. Moreover, democratization
allowed for the erosion of the common goal of economic growth. Hence, Korean
governments were forced into different choices to maintain political stability. From
authoritarian development, South Korea moved to consensual development (Kong 1995,
634-635). During the late '80s and the early '90s the issue of income redistribution
became a priority, unlike previous years where the main goal was to grow first and then
redistribution would follow, although Korea already had one of the most equitable
distributions of income among the developing countries (Kwon 1990, xx.iii).
During the '60s, the income distribution of Korea was_ fairly stable, yet problems
remained between the rural and the urban sectors, despite the efforts of the government to
maintain a stable relationship between rural and urban incomes. The heavy
industrialization of Korea actually aggravated the income redistribution between the rich
and the lower income segments of the population. The existence of a large underground
economy (more than half of its GDP during 1978-1985) contributed even further to
welfare and income inequalities, since the government was unable to collect the
necessary taxes and resources to redistribute income (Yoo 1990, 385). Contrary to
common beliefs that Korea is one country that combines economic growth with equity,
empirical data show that aside from the period 1969-71 _or before 1974, income
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distribution has deteriorated with growth (Yoo 1990, 385). Through the years, the
Korean government has gone from periods where welfare transfers were an essential
component of policy making to alleviate welfare and income inequalities ( early '80sunder the Chun and the Roh regime) to periods of growth-oriented policies (the most
recent example being the 6th five year development plan).
-South Korea provides an interesting case of development, where rapid economic
growth was the primary goal. Nevertheless; the sinister focus oneconomic growth as a
•· i
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goal undermined on multiple occasions the stability of the economic and political system,
weakening the ability of the state to assume its initial developmental role (Kim 1993). In
South Korea the long-term policy did not match the short-term efforts to alleviate
political instability. Often, welfare transfers were used to satisfy the temporary demands
of specific groups in an effort to avoid further confrontations between the labor and the

chaebols. Thus, there was a change of course on policies, which created even further
fears during the '90s.

.The Counter Example ofMalaysia
Understanding the patterns of economic development in Malaysia requires a
comprehension of the fundamental economic and political divisions among the three
ethnic groups that comprise almost 95 per cent of the total population. Until 1969, when
the worst ethnically related civil violence occurred, Malaysia had been relatively stable
and peaceful. The ethnic violence that erupted in Malaysia was related to the
dissatisfaction of the local Malays with a lower economic status compared to the ethnic
Chinese and even that of the Indians. As it will be analyzed further in this section, this
unique characteristic of Malaysian politics led to policies of income distribution that
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seem to be counterintuitive (Meerman 1979).43
Malaysia was part of the United Kingdom's empire, until it became independent
in 1957. Since its independence Malaysia has been a federation of two Borneo states in
Indonesia and 11 states of the Malay peninsula. The population consists of primarily
Malays (55 per cent of the population), Chinese (35 per cent), and Indians (10 per
cent). 44 Among the three ethnic groups, Malays are rural, predominantly residing in the
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four northern states of the peninsula. Chinese are primarily the urban residents with
incomes twice as large as the Malays, residing in the state of Salangor that surrounds the
capital Kuala Lumpur, the most highly developed region in the country. Financially,
Indians fall in: between the Chinese and the Malays, working as rubber tappers. Although
economically the Chinese are by far the most powerful group, politically the Malays have
control (Hammer et al. 1995).
Even though the transition from the British empire to independence was without
serious contention among the three ethnic groups and without any significant
transformation of the political and economic structures, ethnic polarization was the
primary threat to Malaysia's economic development. The political and economic stability
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of Malaysia depended on the balance among the three ethnic groups and particularly
between the Chinese and the Malays. After Independence an elite consensus was reached
via bargaining among the three major political coalitions (United Malays National
Organization (UMNO), the Malayan Chinese Association, and the Malayan Indian
43

Th ethnic divisions of Malaysia are partly the outcome of the colonial policies of Great Britain that
allowed and even encouraged the immigration of Chinese populations to Malaysia altering the demographic
structures in Malaysia.
·
44
The remainder of the population (less than 1 per cent) consists of various ethnic groups. The British
policy of immigration encouraged the explosive mixture of Chinese, Indians, and Malays. Until the
beginning of the 20 th century the Malays were the majority of the population, even further back in history
they were the only ethnic group inhabiting Malaysia. By the end of l 930's Malays were a minority within
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Congress). Malays would have control of the government in exchange for full citizenship
status for the Chinese and the Indians. Nevertheless, the Chinese soon dominated
commerce and business (Root 1996, 70-71 ). The growing economic gap between the
Chinese and the Malays was one of the leading causes of the ethnic bashing against the
Chinese in 1969. Some of the most violent rioting in Malaysia's history occurred
following the election on May 10, 1969 where 196 people were killed.
Through the period of ethnic strife between the Malays and the Chinese, Malaysia
experienced an overall economic growth periods of around of 7 per cent annually from
1961-1976. Economic growth was the outcome of the alliance among the elites that
implemented changes to try and re-distribute resources to the underdeveloped segments
of the Malaysian population. More recently, the Malaysian economy achieved even more
impressive rates of economic growth (on average 9 percent in the period from 1988
through 1996). The financial c,onditions in Malaysia summarized in Table 1 show that
the financial system was strengthened in the past five years. A sharp drop in foreign
direct investment forced the government to tum to incentive packages and to lower
corporate taxes

to 32 % in 1994, and to 30 per cent in 1995 (Coplin and O'Leary

1994, 54).

their own land.
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Note: The Handbook of Country and Political Risk Analysis, pp. 54-56.

Until now, among the developing countries, Malaysia could be characterized as a
success story according to the classical theory of economic growth. Currently Malaysia
is a upper-middle-income developing country with an annual GNP pet capita at the range
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of$4,680 (Atlas method, US$) compared to $10,500 for South Korea and$1,110 for
Indonesia. Since the mid-80s Malaysia's annual growth rate has been higher than that of
South Korea (8.8% and 7.6% for Malaysia and South Korea respectively during the
decade 1987-97). Its income places Malaysia above the average of the upper-middle
income countries, and ahead of all the Latin American countries except Mexico and
'

'

Venezuela.
Malaysia followed a slightly different economic development path than those of
South Korea, Singapore, or other South East Asian countries, which chose economic
growth as the predominant goal, and followed policies of export-led development
pushing the labor force into an effort comparable to wartime periods. The Malaysian
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8.7%
8.6%

economy is a mixture of private enterprises and public management, and the primary goal
has been the achievement of both political and economic stability among the three major
ethnic groups. Trade is one of the primary drives in Malaysia to achieve high levels of
economic growth. Malaysia's exports were 94.3 in US$ billions in 1997, while Korea's
exports were only 38.1. Imports constitute 92.8% of Malaysia's GDP versus 38.8% for
South Korea. ·Constanteconomic growth is a necessary precondition forthe realization
· of the governmental development plans (New Economic Pl,an (NEP)), which allow the
government to utilize the economic resources to redistribute wealth and to alleviate
poverty.
The critical socioeconomic element in Malaysia is the disparity between the
political and economic status among the three ethnic groups. This is related to ethnic
divisions, but also to the division between the rural and urban populations. The ·
extremely slow process of income distribution led to racial conflicts on May 1969, where
the preexisting formula for peaceful co-habitation of the three ethnic groups collapsed.
Riots started in Kuala Lumpur, when Malays demanded the expulsion ofnon-Malays. 45
The Malay political leaders (including the current prime minister Mahatir) argued that
\

economic and political equity among the three ethnic groups was necessary for harmony
to be re-established. In other words Malays demanded to become active economic actors
as well as political actors (Root 1996, 71-72). After that period, the Malaysian
government tried to re-organize the economic and political foundations of the country
and to eradicate ethnic tensions. To do so, the Malay government implemented the New
Economic Policy (NEP), a plan that ran from 1971 through 1990 with a dual goal: (i) first
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At that time Malays controlled only 1.5 percent of businesses, contrary to 22.5 per cent hold by the
Chinese, while the rest of the corporate equity was under foreigners (Root 71).
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it was the eradication of poverty among all Malays,46 and (ii) the second goal was to
reduce the economic disparities among the ethnic groups, so certain levels of income
would not be associated with specific ethnic groups. The most critical element for the
success of the NEP was the continuity and the stability of the state structures. 47
For the NEP to be successful, politicians had to commit to policies that would
prevent any form of power and political abuse in the Malaysian civil service. Moreover,
the Malaysian bureaucracy does not reflect the. inequalities .that .in other countries are
apparent between bureaucrats and citizens such as the Philippines and India. Another
essential component that supports the NEP is the unification of public and private
business into a common national goal and common objectives. Doing so, the Mahatir
government (in power since 1981) introduced the "Malaysian Incorporated Policy"
(1983). The role of the bureaucracy is to support the partnership between private and
public sectors. 48
Based. on the foundations of solidarity between the private and public sectors,
NEP was a rather successful program. An overview of the NEP program shows that the
program to a large extent benefits the rural and poor segments of the population (Malay
in its majority). There are three primary channels of redistribution that the ·Malaysian
government followed: education, health quality and expenditures, and welfare transfers.
The combined federal expenditures per capita on education, health, and pensions were
highest in rural regions, where the Malays live, and lowest in the area of Selangor, where
46

Part of the aggressive policy of political and economic equality was the reaffirmation of equal
citizenship, political participation, and office holding, as well as tolerance of religion, language, and other
institutions of the minority coalitions (Root 1996, 72).
47
Since the NEP allowed for the predominance of politics over economics, the Malaysian government
followed with several acts to monitor and administer the public service and guarantee its neutrality.
48
The Mahatir government favored consultations between private and public sectors to build up a national
consensus, while obsolete laws were abolished, and training programs for managers and bureaucrats were
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most of the Chinese reside. In terms of ethnic groups, controlling for the region, Malays
receive per capita benefits that exceed the mean by 22 per cent, while the Chinese's
benefits are 30 per cent lower than the mean (Meerman 1979, 7).
Although in other areas such as public utilities, the Chinese urban dwellers tend to
benefit more than the rural-residents Malaysia still has a far more equ~l distribution than
other· middle-income developing -countries of resources between rural and. urban
populations. In fact Malaysia's Gini coefficient is one of theJo:westin the region (33.7),
while South Korea's Gini coefficient is 33.9 and China's is 34.5. Malaysia has one of the
lowest percentages of population below the poverty lines in the world. The percentage of·
the· population below the poverty line is 15.5 nationally (in 1989), while Indonesia's
population below the poverty line is 17.9 (1987), India's is 40.9 (1992), and the
Philippine's is 52.0 (1985). The significance of low income inequality is critical for
further economic development, as most of the empirical studies on growth indicate that
higher levels of inequality reduce the rate of economic growth (Feng 1998, Perotti 1996).
The caveat to the successful implementation of the NEP is high rates of economic
growth. 49
The policies of NEP have been the most successful in the area of medical care.
Rural areas have above the average and far above the metropolitan areas' consumption of
medical services. Race and levels of income are not determinants of the use of medical
facilities (Meerman 1979, 310). In 1974, 19 per cent of all public expenditures on inpatient visits was received by the poorest quintile and 20 per cent by the richest. In 1984
25 per cent of the expenditures was received by the poorest quintile, while the richest
established with the participation of the private sector (Root 1996, 83-84).
Equality should be achieved through employment and assets, rather than expropriation or use of existing
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quintile received 16 per cent of the total expenditures (Hammer et al. 1995, 530-532).
These results imply that more poor people used public medical facilities than the richer
segments of the population after the implementation ofNEP. Comparing across
countries, 88 per cent of the Malaysian population has access to health care, whereas only
43 percent has access in Indonesia, and 59 per cent in Thailand. The best medical access
in the region is in South Korea{lO0 per cent) (World Bank 1998).
Overall, NEP's policies regarding health expenditures and education were
.i
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effective in redistributing resources and improved the quality of the human capital with
significant ramifications for the whole economy and economic growth (Hammer et al:
1995, 540-541). Aside from the tangible and direct effect that these variables may have
on economic and social development, there are externalities that are created either in the
form of increasing productivity of the labor force, or in maintaining poHtical stability.
The role of the private sector is critical in providing services and resources to the richest
segments of the population and releasing public resources for the poorest segments of the
population (Hammer et al. 1995, 548).
In the case of Malaysia, the combination of private and public economy does not
coincide with the neo-classical growth policies. Despite the seriousness of the current
situation, Malaysia remains a success story over the last twenty years. Even more
important is that the ethnic and socio-economic divisions in the Malaysian society did not
become a burden for its economic development, unlike the African countries where after
the decolonization process ethnic strives destroyed any attempts to build up a stable
political and economic environment (e.g., Uganda, Congo, Somalia).
The success of Malaysia can be attributed to political institutions, which actually
wealth (Meerman 1995, 28).
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affect some of the fundamental economic variables. Private savings and investment, as
well as a decline in income inequality, are critical in affecting economic growth. The
political institutions within a country reflect the levels of political and economic freedom,
and they determine the levels of political stability and consensus. A stable political
environment attracts both foreign and domestic investment,. while private savings
increase (Feng 1998, Alesina and Sachs 1988,Cukierman; Edwards, and Tabellini 1992).
The two case studies illustrate the choices of governments-regarding economic
::)
·I

growth and political stability. Malaysia, on the other hand, is a country that encountered
the problem of ethnic divisions. For Malaysia building consensus was essential before
economic growth could be achieved as a goal. There was an interest for the government
and the ruling elites to build political consensus among the three groups that will be
stable in the long-run. Hence, short-term concerns of political stability and long-tern1
goals for economic development had to coincide. The elaborate welfare policies
established by the NEP policies indicated the long-term commitment ·of the Malaysian
governments to an equitable distribution of resources among the three ethnic groups.
Hence, shared economic growth was almost a necessity for the country to be able to
develop._
Malaysia's economic development has been less spectacular though more stable
than that of South Korea and with much fewer incidents of political instability, aside
from the unique case of 1969. South Korean government policy choices were not inferior
than those of Malaysia, but inspired by different goals and time preferences. Initially
South Korean governments aligned with the chaebols had more power and resources not
to consider long-term commitment to welfare policies. It was only after the erosion of
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the economic system and the increasing levels of democratization that made groups such
as labor politically relevant that the South Korean governments were faced with the
policy dilemma of being socially responsive vs. economic growth.

4. Concluding Discussion
Why do governments use welfare transfers? Governments apply welfare transfers
to prevent regime changes. In some cases (e.g.~ South Korea) the policy choice is to
<i

temporarily prevent the political unrest with short-term programs. In other cases, such as

:··!

that of Malaysia, governments try to combine short-term and long-term goals. This study
offers two critical points in the area of social and economic development. First, welfare
programs can not merely be reduced or increased. They are the outcome of fundamental
i

structural changes that alter the nature of the political and the economic system and

J

l

J

systematic policy choices to balance out social stability with economic development.

j

Although political issues are often overlooked in the studies of the welfare state, in policy
recommendations it is critical to consider that the welfare state was established for the
:1

l

very political reason of regime stability. Hence, the welfare state cannot be studied in

:j.,

political vacuum and as long as governments use welfare transfers, we need to explore

·I

:,

j
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their role in economic and political development.
Second, for welfare transfers to be beneficial, the short-term goals of regime

i!
j

stability must converge with the longer goals of a more equitable distribution, sustained
economic growth, and political stability. The significant distinction between the longterm and the short-term choices of welfare transfers is quite prominent in the cases of
South Korea and Malaysia.. These government choices become even more relevant under
the increasing effects of globalization on domestic economies. This study points out that
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more research is required in defining and explaining why some governments choose
short-term goals and others long-term ones and what are the long-term effects of each
type of policymaking. Welfare programs are a complicated institutional structure that
·needs to be studied under a different theoretical and empirical light, where emphasis
shifts from economic choices to political ones .
•I
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